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Abstract 
A central finding in happiness research is low correlations between income and happiness. This is 
paradoxical since most people seem to attach a high value to a rise in their income. The various 
versions of this paradox can be explained in terms of rising aspirations (Easterlin 2001) and posi-
tional externalities (Frank 1997). However, econometric/ statistical studies which test these ex-
planations on the level of individual cross-sections are rare and have produced mixed results. A 
careful analysis of the results of such studies leads to the conclusion that there seems to be con-
siderable support for the explanations mentioned. On the other hand, these explanations seem 
only partial and do not take into account top-down relations between life satisfaction and aspira-
tion levels as implied by some studies. Therefore, an alternative explanation of the above paradox 
in terms of the intrinsic/extrinsic-goals distinction of Kasser and Ryan (1993) is investigated. This 
approach points to a second kind of discrepancy between decision utility and experienced utility 
of income and implies that life satisfaction depends on absolute rather than relative income. It has 
some potential, but, in its present stage, it yields less specific predictions with respect to the para-
doxes than the theories of aspirations and positional externalities. On the other hand, in the case 
of top-down relations between life satisfaction and aspiration levels, the intrinsic/extrinsic-goals 
explanation seems more fundamental. 
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1 Introduction 
A central finding in happiness research is low correlations between income and happi-
ness. This is remarkable since most people seem to attach a high value to a rise in their 
income, as indicated by their behaviour (e.g. labour supply) and stated preferences (see, 
e.g., Frank 1999 and Easterlin 2001). This ‘classical’ paradox manifests itself on at least 
three levels. First, in most developed nations average happiness has not or only slightly 
increased in the last half of a century despite economic growth. Secondly, cross sections 
of average happiness levels across developed countries reveal weak or zero income ef-
fects on happiness (e.g. Frey and Stutzer 2002). Finally, in cross sections of individual 
happiness levels within a given developed country, income-happiness correlations and 
effects turn out to be small in comparison to those for other determinants of happiness, 
especially over the 75 upper percent of a country’s income distribution (see, e.g., Diener 
et al. 1993, Frey and Stutzer 2002). 
The first (time-series) version of the paradox has been explained by Easterlin 
(1974, 2001) and Frank (1997) in terms of rising aspirations and positional externalities. 
The second version of the paradox, the absence of a substantial income effect on happi-
ness for cross sections of developed countries, can be explained in a similar way, but the 
third version for cross-sections of individuals has received little systematic attention in 
the literature (see Frey and Stutzer (2002) for a discussion of the role of relative income 
and treadmills) and requires a more subtle approach. Although these explanations sound 
convincing, econometric or statistical studies which test these explanations on the level of 
individual cross-sections are rare and have produced mixed results. For American, Ger-
man and Swiss data, McBride (2001), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2002) and Stutzer (2002), re-
spectively, find econometric support for the influence of relative-income variables (see 
also Schyns (2001) for Russia), but Diener et al. (1993) find no evidence. In the view of 
Diener et al. and Veenhoven (1991), happiness is absolute rather than relative, reflects 
satisfaction of universal needs rather than social comparison, and represents an emotional 
feeling rather than a cognitive judgement. 
The first purpose of this paper is to investigate the plausibility of these claims ver-
sus the claims of Easterlin and Frank by a careful analysis of the results of the economet-
ric/statistical studies mentioned above. Our general conclusion from this analysis is that 
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especially the estimation results of Stutzer (2002) in favour of the aspiration-level theory 
of Easterlin (2001) look convincing and that the absence of any evidence for an influence 
of relative-income variables in the study of Diener et al. may be due to misspecifications 
of such influence. On the other hand, the results of Stutzer also suggest that the explana-
tions of the income-happiness paradoxes in terms of rising aspirations and positional ex-
ternalities may only be partial. Moreover, there is some evidence that, contrary to what is 
assumed in the aspiration-level theory, causality is not so much running from aspiration 
levels towards happiness, but rather from happiness towards aspiration levels (Headey et 
al. 1991). More specifically, people who have a predisposition to feel unhappy tend to 
have higher aspiration levels than those with a disposition to feel happy. This suggests 
that the hedonic-level-of-affect component of happiness may be more fundamental than 
its cognitive-evaluation component in the sense of the former influencing the latter rather 
than the other way around. 
This calls for a perhaps more fundamental explanation of the income-happiness 
paradoxes in terms of the affective component of happiness. A possible candidate for 
such an explanation is offered by the findings of Kasser and Ryan (1993, 1996; see also 
Kasser and Ahuvia 2002). They made a distinction between intrinsic goals (like self-
acceptance and affiliation) and extrinsic goals (like financial success and social recogni-
tion) and found that persons who strongly focus on extrinsic goals tend to be relatively 
less happy. This points to a second kind of discrepancy between (ex ante) decision utility 
and (ex post) experienced utility of income3 on top of that brought about by unanticipated 
rises of the aspiration level as suggested by Easterlin. Thus, a second purpose of this pa-
per is to investigate the extent to which this approach may offer an alternative explana-
tion of the income-happiness paradoxes. We conclude that it has some potential, but that, 
in its present stage, it yields less specific predictions with respect to the paradoxes than 
the aspiration-level approach. Furthermore, there seem to be some intriguing interrela-
tions between both approaches. 
                                                 
3 The distinction between decision utility and experienced utility has been introduced by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1984). 
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The organisation of this paper is as follows. First, section 2 gives a short review 
of the main empirical findings with respect to the paradoxes. Section 3 analyses the ex-
planations of these paradoxes in terms of rising aspirations and positional externalities as 
well as the mixed evidence from individual-cross-section studies. Section 4 discusses the 
alternative explanation suggested by the intrinsic/extrinsic-goals approach of Kasser and 
Ryan. Finally, section 5 makes some concluding remarks on the interrelations between 
the two approaches. 
 
2 Main empirical findings 
Most people seem to attach a high value to their level of income. This is evidenced by 
their economic behaviour as well as by their stated preferences. Examples of the former 
revealed preferences are the dominant role of the wage rate in individual labour supply 
decisions (Pencavel 1986; Killingsworth and Heckman 1986) and the recurrence of 
strikes of labour unions for a higher wage. Another example is the ‘luxury fever’ in con-
sumption as documented in Frank (1999) for the USA. Stated preferences can, for in-
stance, be inferred from the results of the well-known survey of Cantril (1965) about the 
concerns of people in fourteen countries (as mentioned in Easterlin 2001). In answers to 
open-ended questions about what people want out of life, material circumstances, espe-
cially standard of living, were, in every country, mentioned most often. 
Against this background, it is surprising that happiness research usually yields low or 
at best moderate correlations between income and life satisfaction in developed countries. 
To bring some order into the data, we classify the empirical results by two criteria. The 
first criterion is the level of aggregation, where a distinction is made between an individ-
ual focus and a national focus. The second criterion is the comparison perspective, which 
can be either a cross-section or a time-series perspective. This classification gives rise to 
a two by two matrix as in table 1. 
  Comparison perspective 
  Cross-section Time series 
Individual 1a 1b Level of 
aggregation National 2a 2b 
Table 1 - A classification of life-satisfaction research. 
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The most striking result is that the correlations between average life satisfaction 
and average income in developed countries over time (category 2b) are not significantly 
different from zero for many countries and for most periods (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer 
2002, sec. 4.3). This is consistent with Easterlin’s (2001) finding from a synthetic cohort 
analysis that life satisfaction is practically constant over any given cohort’s life cycle. 
This finding suggests that correlations between individual life satisfaction and income 
over time (category 1b) are zero or low. Even major changes in income like winning a 
lottery may only have positive effects on life satisfaction in the short run (Gardner and 
Oswald 2001), but zero or even negative effects in a longer run (Argyle 1999). For cross-
sections of average life satisfaction and average income in developed countries (category 
2a), it is found that income effects and correlations are weak or zero across countries with 
an average annual income level above U.S. $10,000 (e.g. Diener and Suh 1999, Kenny 
1999, Frey and Stutzer 2002). Moreover, for particular data sets of developed as well as 
developing countries, the correlations are even insignificant when variables for individu-
alism (as defined by Hofstede 1991) or equality are controlled for (Diener et al. 1995). 
Finally, cross-sectional correlations between individual life satisfaction and in-
come within developed countries (category 1a) tend to be higher, but are still low in 
comparison to those for other determinants of life satisfaction (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer 
2002, sec. 4.4.1). For example, for data for the USA, Diener et al. (1993) found correla-
tions of 0.13 and 0.12 (implying that less than 2% of the variance in life satisfaction is 
explained by variations in income) and Easterlin (2001) found a correlation of 0.20. 
Moreover, they established a curvilinear pattern in the relation between income and life 
satisfaction.4 For income levels above U.S. $10,000, the data of Easterlin are easily calcu-
lated to imply an average ‘elasticity’ of life satisfaction with respect to income of roughly 
0.2, which seems small. A similar pattern can be observed in other industrialised coun-
tries (see, e.g., Inglehart 1990, table 7-10). For West Germany, Glatzer (1991) found no 
clear income effect on life satisfaction between the second and fifth income quintile. For 
Switzerland, Frey and Stutzer (2002: 83-85) even found a somewhat lower life satisfac-
tion for the highest-income group than for the second highest. 
                                                 
4 Regressing life satisfaction on log income Easterlin (2001: 468) finds a linear relation.  
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A problem in judging the size of non-zero (positive) income effects is that it 
seems very hard to assess whether these effects are smaller than the size one may expect 
on the basis of income-related behaviour and preferences. In the case of labour supply 
behaviour one should then also know the effects on life satisfaction of leisure and work-
ing time. Therefore, at this stage of research, we can only say that positive income effects 
on life satisfaction seem small in comparison to what one could expect on the basis of 
income-related behaviour and stated preferences. Just like the zero income effects re-
ported above, this suggests a difference between, on the one hand, (ex ante) decision util-
ity which is supposed to govern income-related behaviour and, on the other hand, the (ex 
post) life satisfaction as a result of that behaviour. In the context of this paper we assume 
that the decision utility of alternative income levels is given by the expected contributions 
of income levels to life satisfaction.5 On the other hand, the ex post experienced contribu-
tion of the chosen income level to life satisfaction is referred to as experienced utility.6 
 
3 Dynamics of aspiration levels and positional externalities 
a. General analysis 
Economists like Easterlin (1974, 1991) and Frank (1997) consider as one of the important 
explanations for the empirical findings reported above the dynamics of rising aspiration 
levels and positional externalities. The working of these dynamics in the four cases of the 
paradox described above can be explained as follows.  
There are two main effects involved, namely hedonic adaptation and positional 
externalities. In general terms, hedonic adaptation is the reduction of the hedonic, i.e., 
happiness-relevant, response to a constant or repeated stimulus (Frederick and Loewen-
stein 1999: 302). It can take the form of a shift of the baseline stimulus level, i.e., the 
stimulus experienced as neutral (baseline shift), or that of a reduction of the intensity of 
                                                 
5 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that decision utility is cardinal and that expected and actual life 
satisfaction are separable in income and other variables (e.g. leisure). 
6 As usual in happiness research (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer 2002, Sec. 1.2), we consider (overall) life satis-
faction as a specific concept of subjective happiness or well-being. Life satisfaction is strongly influenced 
by cognitive processes, and should be distinguished from more hedonic measures of subjective or objective 
happiness (see Peiró, 2003, for an empirical application of this distinction).  
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any given response without a shift of the zero point (desensitisation; ibid.). In this con-
text, two kinds of adaptation processes can be distinguished: psychophysical adaptation 
and cognitive adaptation. The distinguishing feature of psychophysical adaptation is that 
the sensory response to a constant or repeated stimulus itself is reduced (e.g., pupil con-
traction). Cognitive adaptation, on the other hand, involves a reassessment of an invariant 
perception (e.g., getting used to the conveniences of one’s new car). This kind of adapta-
tion is the most relevant one for the case of life satisfaction, in which cognitive evaluation 
and judgement play an important role. It implies that people get used to a higher or lower 
income level and accordingly adjust their level of life satisfaction. This involves a base-
line shift rather than desensitisation and renders a person’s life satisfaction negatively de-
pendent on her income in the past.  
The second main effect can be summarised under the heading of positional exter-
nalities. These can be divided into two kinds of effect. The first effect we will call secon-
dary inflation (Hirata 2001: 36; cf. fig. 1). Analogous to the expansion of the monetary 
mass that reduces the value of money with respect to commodities, the expansion of the 
average income in “real terms” or in terms of “commodity purchasing power” (i.e., cor-
rected for what we will call “primary inflation”) may lead to a reduction of the value of 
income with respect to what Sen (1985) calls functionings7. This effect is at work in its 
purest form where positional goods are involved. A positional good (Hirsch 1976: 27) is 
characterised by some absolute limitation on its availability to society, either because it is 
a rival good in fixed supply (e.g., Van Gogh’s masterpieces) or because an increase in 
consumption will lead to congestion (e.g., a lonely beach). Positional goods are therefore 
valued for their relative superiority, which, because of their absolute scarcity, does not 
erode as society becomes richer. In all cases the payoff of one’s effort or expenditure to 
obtain a positional good depends to a large extent on the effort and expenditure of others 
because one’s payoff is a function of one’s position in some kind of competition. A given 
functioning, e.g., making holidays in a lonely cottage, will then become ever more expen-
                                                 
7 “A functioning is an achievement of a person: what he or she manages to do or to be. ... It has to be dis-
tinguished from the commodities which are used to achieve those functionings. ... . It has to be distin-
guished also from the happiness generated by the functioning, for example, actually cycling around must 
not be identified with the pleasure obtained from that.” (Sen 1985: 10) 
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sive because it requires finding ever more remote places as the newly rich settle on the 
formerly quiet spots. 
 
   money commodities functionings SWB 
 § © § © § © 
primary inflation secondary inflation frame-of-reference effect 
  
Figure 1 - The utility chain linking money and SWB (Hirata 2001: 37). 
 
Apart from positional goods, the cost of a given functioning in terms of commodities 
also depends on the life styles of others as far as social interactions link individuals to-
gether. For example, as people become richer and own more cars, and society richer to 
build additional roads, public transport may deteriorate (as has arguably been the case in 
Los Angeles for example). As a consequence, some people will be forced to buy a car in 
order to get to places where they formerly could go by bus. The additional expenditures 
involved do not, however, enter into the calculation of the official (primary) inflation 
rate, because in terms of goods and services consumption does indeed increase. Yet, in 
order to express the “functioning purchasing power” of money, prices have to be cor-
rected for secondary inflation as well. 
The second kind of positional externality could be called the “frame-of-reference ef-
fect” (cf. Frank 1997). This effect is at work to the extent that the increase of one’s refer-
ence group’s consumption reduces the life satisfaction one derives from a given activity, 
increasing one’s aspirations and evaluation standards. For example, when all families in 
one’s neighbourhood increase their holidays spending, one’s own desire to go on simi-
larly adventurous holidays is likely to increase, and one’s capacity to enjoy any given 
holiday trip to decrease. The frame-of-reference effect is closely linked to what in the 
psychological literature is called relative deprivation (Stouffer et al. 1949) and social 
comparison (Festinger 1954, Olson et al. 1986). 
The distinction between the secondary inflation and the frame-of-reference effect can 
best be formulated in terms of functionings. Secondary inflation is the rate of real income 
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growth required to maintain one’s level of functionings, whereas the frame-of-reference 
effect alters the set of functionings that will maintain an individual’s level of life satisfac-
tion (fig. 1). The former is a primarily external allocative effect, while the latter is rather 
internal or psychological (also called practical and social-psychological effects, respec-
tively; e.g., Vendrik 1993: 112). Since functionings reflect objective living conditions 
(not to be confused with material living standard), we have here an important distinction 
between indirect income effects on life satisfaction via living conditions and direct in-
come effects on life satisfaction. To be sure, the two effects will often be hard to separate 
in practice. For example, expensive clothes may serve partly to maintain one’s level of 
the functioning of social recognition and partly to raise this level of functioning so as to 
maintain one’s level of life satisfaction (or perhaps to effectively raise life satisfaction). 
Nevertheless, the distinction between the secondary inflation and the frame-of-reference 
effect will be useful as a conceptual distinction which we will use below. 
In both cases of positional externalities, a person’s life satisfaction (LS) will nega-
tively depend on the incomes of other people (e.g. in a person’s social reference group in 
the case of frame-of-reference effects). Identifying which “other people” are involved is a 
very thorny problem, which has prompted researchers to make simplifying approxima-
tions. A useful approximation is to assume that a person’s LS depends negatively on the 
average income in a person’s social group Y s, which is the group of people in the per-
son’s categories of age, sex, education, income, region of residence etc. (Ferrer-i-
Carbonell 2002). In addition, there will be an influence from wider groups, which can be 
captured by the average income in a person’s community or region of residence Y r (Die-
ner et al. 1993, Stutzer 2002) and/or the average income in a person’s cohort (McBride 
2001) or country, Y c. These variables as well as past income Y-1 we call relative income 
standard (RIS) variables. 
Several studies have shown the impact of RIS variables on satisfaction with income 
(e.g., Van Praag and Frijters 1999, Kapteyn and Wansbeek 1985, Clark and Oswald 
1996), but there are only few studies which have tried to estimate the effect of RIS vari-
ables on overall life satisfaction (LS). For our purposes, the most useful ones are statisti-
cal/econometric studies of cross-sections of individual inhabitants of developed countries 
(category 1a in table 1). In fact, we know only three of them, namely McBride (2001) for 
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US data, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2002) for German data, and Stutzer (2002) for Swiss data.8 
The last one is particularly interesting since it uses data for aspiration level as an inter-
mediate variable between RIS variables and life satisfaction. The aspiration level of 4554 
respondents to a Swiss survey between 1992 and 1994 was measured in two ways: (i) as 
the income level that people consider to be sufficient for their entire household according 
to answers to a standard income evaluation question (cf. Van Praag 1993), (ii) as the 
household income that people consider to be an absolute minimum. Both measures have 
the advantage that they capture not only adaptation and frame-of-reference effects, but 
also secondary (together with primary) inflation. Therefore, and since Stutzer’s study 
yields important additional insights in comparison to the other studies, we use Stutzer’s 
model with some different RIS variables as our framework. 
 
b. Specific analysis 
Stutzer assumes that a person’s LS is related to her income Y and her income aspiration 
level Y* as 
LS = α + β lnY - γ lnY* + δ lnX + e (1) 
where X is a vector of control variables and e is an error term. The parameters β and γ are 
supposed to be non-negative and δ is a vector of parameters. Equation (1) can be rewrit-
ten as 
LS = α + (β - γ) lnY + γ (lnY - lnY*) + δ lnX + e, (2) 
which separates the effect of the discrepancy between log income and log aspiration level 
from the pure effect of the log income level. The discrepancy variable can also be written 
as ln(Y/Y*). Stutzer finds that this variable has a sizeable and significantly positive effect 
on LS (γ > 0), whereas lnY ‘as such’ has only a slight and insignificantly positive effect 
(β ≈ γ). Thus, an equal relative rise of income and aspiration level will produce two com-
pletely offsetting effects on LS for these Swiss data (as assumed by Easterlin (2001: 473) 
in his model).  
                                                 
8 The cross-section study of Diener et al. (1993) uses subjective-well-being data for hedonic level of affect 
(see below). Research results of Schyns for German data had not yet been sent to us when we finished this 
paper. 
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However, the question is: do income and aspiration levels rise at the same pace? 
(This is a crucial assumption in Easterlin’s (2001) model (p. 473).) To answer this ques-
tion, we assume, in line with Stutzer, that the aspiration level Y* depends on the RIS 
variables introduced above as 
lnY* = ϕ 0 + ϕ -1 lnY-1 + ϕ s ln Y s + ϕ r lnY r+ ϕ c lnY c + χ ln Z + e*, (3)  
where Z is a vector of control variables and e* is an error term. The parameters ϕ-1, ϕs , ϕr 
and ϕc are supposed to be non-negative parameters and χ is a vector of parameters. Since 
the social influence from closer groups can be expected to be stronger than that from 
wider groups, we expect ϕs > ϕr > ϕc with ϕc referring to country.9 Stutzer approximates 
people’s previous income Y-1 with people’s reported household income and models social 
influence by the effect of average income in a person’s community of residence Y r, but 
excludes the other social-influence variables in eq. (3).10 He then finds significant esti-
mates for ϕ -1 and ϕ r of 0.40 and 0.19, respectively. He notes that the latter estimate may 
also include the positive effect on income aspirations of higher costs of living in commu-
nities with a higher average income. Interestingly, in terms of fig. 1, these higher costs of 
living can be explained as both an effect of higher consumer prices due to a higher aggre-
gate demand (primary inflation) and an effect of higher expenditures on positional goods 
to reach given levels of functionings (secondary inflation). In order to disentangle the ef-
fects of costs of living and of social comparison, Stutzer includes an indicator for social 
interactions with neighbours in his regressions and finds that at least 0.11 of the estimate 
0.19 of ϕ r can be attributed to social comparison. Together, Stutzer’s estimates for ϕ -1 
and ϕ r suggest that when a rise in income is accompanied by proportional rises in aver-
age income Y r as well as previous income Y-1, the aspiration level Y* also rises, but at a 
slower pace than Y. More specifically, a 10% increase in income then leads to a 6% in-
                                                 
9 An interesting hypothesis of Easterlin (2001) is that younger people have wider social reference groups 
than older people and that past personal experience becomes more important over the life cycle. In the con-
text of eq. (3), this suggests that ϕs and ϕ-1 grow and ϕr and ϕc fall over the life cycle. 
10 Stutzer also estimates the effects of some other RIS variables in his regressions, which yields interesting 
results. However, these results are less important in the context/ of this paper.  
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crease in aspiration level. Thus, Easterlin’s assumption that income and aspiration levels 
rise at the same pace over the lifecycle is not confirmed by Stutzer’s results.  
For a much smaller American data set (324 usable observations) for 1994 
McBride (2001) finds less significant, but possibly stronger effects of RIS variables on 
life satisfaction. As a proxy for the effect of Y-1 he uses four dummy variables which in-
dicate the degree to which a person thinks his standard of living is better or worse than 
his parents’ standard of living when they were his age. As a social-influence variable he 
adopts the average income in a person’s cohort Y c, where the cohort consists of everyone 
from 5 years younger than the person to 5 years older. In careful ordered-probit regres-
sions, McBride then estimates the direct effect of these variables, Y and control variables 
on LS without an intermediate variable for aspirations. To assess the implications of his 
results in the context of our framework , we substitute eq. (3) for the aspiration level Y* 
into eq. (1) for LS, yielding 
      LS = α - γϕ0 + β lnY - γϕ -1 lnY-1 - γϕ s lnY s - γϕ r lnY r - γϕ c lnY c + δ lnX - γ γχ lnZ + e-γe*. (4) 
From his regressions McBride finds estimated coefficients for lnY and lnY c with the ex-
pected signs. However, these coefficients are not separately significant, but only jointly 
significant in combination with the other coefficients. Although these estimates cannot be 
considered as direct estimates of β and γϕc, their difference in size strongly suggests that 
ϕγ c is substantially larger than β. McBride uses his cross-section estimates to simulate the 
development of the average LS of synthetic cohorts over the life cycle (as considered by 
Easterlin 2001; category 1b in table 1). In this case a considerable part of the positive ef-
fect of a rise in average income Y on average LS seems to run via the four dummy vari-
ables for the effect of Y-1 since the parents’ standards of living when they were of the 
same age are likely to be more or less fixed. As a result, the simulations reveal a down-
ward or zero trend in average LS over time, where the downward trend is attributed by 
McBride to problems in the measurement of the dummies for Y-1 . Thus, McBride can 
replicate the approximate constancy of average LS in American cohorts over the life cy-
cle as found by Easterlin (2001), and thus lend support to both this finding and Easterlin’s 
explanation. McBride also aggregates the cohort simulations to simulations of average LS 
in the whole American population over time (category 2b in table 1) and replicates the 
zero trend which is found empirically. However, McBride does not consider these results 
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conclusive because of separate insignificance of the coefficients of the income and some 
of the RIS variables and because of structural differences of the income and RIS parame-
ters between high and low-income groups (see the end of the next subsection). 
For a much larger data set for West and East Germany (about 16,000 individuals) 
for 1992-1997 Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2002) finds significant negative effects of ln average 
income in a person’s social group Y s (similar education and age, and same region, i.e. 
West or East Germany) on LS. These effects have approximately the same size as the ef-
fects of ln income Y on LS, implying that the coefficients β and γϕ s in eq. (4) are similar 
in magnitude. This predicts zero trends of average LS in German social groups and co-
horts over time (see Glatzer 1991, Table 13.9). Moreover, it does so without including a 
proxy for Y-1. 
In general, a full explanation of zero trends in average LS in developed countries 
over time requires that the sum of coefficients γϕ -1 + γϕ s + γϕ r + γϕ c in eq. (4) ap-
proximately equals β. For Stutzer’s estimation results, where β ≈ γ, this implies that the 
sum of RIS coefficients ϕ -1 + ϕ s + ϕr + ϕ c in eq. (3) should be approximately equal to 
one. In this national time-series case a rise in average income is accompanied by a pro-
portional rise in all average RIS variables, and this would then lead to a proportional rise 
in the aspiration level Y* by virtue of eq. (3), implying no change in LS according to eq. 
(2) with β ≈ γ. Stutzer does not estimate effects of the RIS variables Y s and Y c in eq. (3), 
but since Y s (the average income in a person’s social group of people with similar in-
come) is probably strongly positively correlated with Y-1 the effect of Y s is likely to be 
included for the greater part into the estimated ϕ -1 = 0.40. Moreover, an additional effect 
of Y c (in cohort or country) can be expected to be smaller than the estimated effect ϕ r = 
0.19 of Y r. So, even if Stutzer had been able to estimate the effects of Y s and Y c (which 
is of course impossible for a country’s Y c in a national cross-section), the total estimated 
sum of RIS coefficients in eq. (3) would probably be substantially lower than one. Still, 
Stutzer’s estimation results can account for a large part of an explanation of the zero 
trends in average LS in developed countries over time. 
By the same token, the weak or zero income effects on average LS in cross-
sections of developed countries (category 2a in table 1), in which all RIS variables vary 
along with average income, can be explained by the results of McBride and Ferrer-i-
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Carbonell and, at least partially, by those of Stutzer. The zero trends in average LS of co-
horts in developed countries over time (category 1b) are explained for a smaller part by 
Stutzer’s results since then the RIS variables Y r and Y c for community or region of resi-
dence and country will not fully follow variations in average Y in the cohort over time. 
This as well as the previous analysis is summarised in table 2. Here the “++” signs in the 
second column indicate the relatively strong positive effects of a rise in Y on LS or deci-
sion utility (DU). A “-“ indicates that a rise in Y is counteracted in its effect on LS by a 
proportional rise in the respective RIS variable, a “0” indicates no rise in the respective 
RIS variable or LS, and “0/-” indicates an in-between case of a less-than-proportional rise 
in the respective RIS variable. Finally, the signs in the last column indicate the overall 
reaction of LS or DU to a rise in Y. 
 
 Y Y-1 Y s Y r Y c LS or DU 
National LS over time  ++ - - - - 0 
Cross-sect. of national LS ++ - - - - 0 
Cohort LS over time ++ - - 0/- 0/- 0 
Cross-sect. of individual LS ++ - - 0/- 0 + 
Decision utility DU ++ 0 0 0 0 ++ 
 
Table 2 – The effects of rises in income and relative income standards on life satisfaction 
and decision utility. 
 
Finally, the aspiration-level approach can give an explanation of the empirical 
finding that the income effects on LS are higher in cross-sections of individuals in a de-
veloped country (category 1a) than in the other cases. In that case past income Y-1 and 
average income in a person’s social group (with similar income) Y s will be proportion-
ately higher for rich persons than for poor persons, but the average income in the country 
Y c is the same for rich as for poor persons and the average income in the community or 
region of residence Y r may not differ very much between rich and poor people. As a re-
sult, the positive effect of a higher income Y on LS is counteracted only (or primarily) and 
less than completely by the negative effects of higher Y-1 and Y s on LS. 
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 At the same time, this result can also form the basis for an explanation why the 
income effects on LS in individual cross-sections in a developed country are lower than 
what one may expect on the basis of the high value that people seem to attach to their 
level of income, as indicated by their behaviour and stated preferences (see sec. 2). Fol-
lowing Easterlin (2001), we assume that in decisions related to income individuals 
maximise their expected life satisfaction LS as given by eq. (1). However, they are as-
sumed not to anticipate that when they get a higher income Y, their past income Y-1 and 
some of the other three relative income standards will rise as well over time. Hence, a 
doubling of their income will raise their decision utility by 0.74β points11, so 0.32 points 
for Stutzers estimated β of 0.43. However, the life satisfaction that individuals experience 
after an income-raising decision has been made (i.e., their experienced utility) will be 
lower than expected since some or all of the RIS variables will have risen along with their 
income. In the context of the individual cross-sections, the RIS variables that have higher 
values for higher Y are primarily Y-1 and Y s. This raises the aspiration level of a rich as 
compared to a poor person, and hence suppresses the difference in LS between the rich 
and the poor. A doubling of Y, and hence of Y-1 and Y s (at constant Y r), will now imply a 
difference in LS of 0.74×(β - γϕ -1 - γϕ s) = 0.21 points for Stutzer’s estimates (β = 0.43, γ 
= 0.38, ϕ-1 = 0.40, assuming that the effect of ϕ s is included in the estimate of ϕ-1). Thus, 
according to Stutzer’s estimates, the income effect on LS in a Swiss individual cross-
section is about two third (.21/.32) of the supposed income effect in people’s average de-
cision utility. For a German data set Ferrer-i-Carbonell’s estimated γϕ s≈β even implies 
an approximately zero income effect, which is consistent with the absence of a clear in-
come effect on LS between the second and fifth income quintile of a West-German cross-
section as found by Glatzer (1991). Hence, we can say that the impression of a lower in-
come effect on LS in individual cross-sections as compared to the income effect on deci-
sion utility is consistent with what the aspiration-level approach predicts. Nevertheless, 
the former impression has still to be underpinned by quantitative estimates. 
 An important point to note is that even when people fully anticipate rises in their 
past income Y-1 and in the average income in their social environment, there is a Pris-
                                                 
11 It is easily shown that the decision utility will rise by 2/e times β points, where e = 2.718. 
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oner’s-dilemma effect of positional externalities on their decision utility. In that case, 
people anticipate that a rise in their income Y will only lead to a moderate or zero rise in 
their LS, but also that no rise in Y will imply a fall in their LS when the income in their 
social environment rises. This gives them an incentive to take income-raising decisions, 
but if everybody does so, nobody will gain much in LS. This represents an explanation of 
the above paradoxes in terms of collective irrationality, which does not require the indi-
vidual irrationality of a discrepancy between decision and experienced utility. 
 
c. Critical studies 
Thus, the aspiration-level (and positional-externalities) approach seems quite successful 
in explaining at least partially the empirical findings of zero or low correlations between 
income and life satisfaction on different levels of analysis. However, individual and na-
tional cross-section studies by Diener et al. (1993) and Diener et al. (1995) raise doubts 
about the empirical relevance of the aspiration-level approach. The former study analyses 
10 years longitudinal data for subjective well-being (SWB) and a lot of determining vari-
ables in a probability sample of 4942 American adults. This comprises one cross-section 
of individuals surveyed between 1971-1975 and another one for the same individuals be-
tween 1981 and 1984. The correlations between family income and SWB were 0.13 and 
0.12, respectively, and curvilinear relations between income and SWB were established. 
However, no evidence for the influence of RIS variables on SWB was found: Possible 
adaptation effects were examined by exploring the effect income changes from the first to 
the second period had on SWB, controlling for the level of income. This did not yield 
significant results. Furthermore, the SWB levels of people with comparable incomes liv-
ing in poorer versus richer geographical areas (a county or contiguous counties) were 
compared to each other. This did not yield significant differences either. Similarly insig-
nificant effects of RIS variables were found in cross-national studies by Diener et al. 
(1993, 1995). The 1995 study is the more extensive one and comprises SWB data for 55 
countries as reported in probability surveys and a large college student sample. Possible 
adaptation effects were examined by correlating the growth of per capita real GDP of na-
tions with SWB. This produced insignificant or inconsistent correlations with the main 
correlation being insignificantly negative when absolute levels of income were controlled 
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for. Social comparison was taken into account by investigating its effects on SWB in 
three ways. One of the correlations had the “wrong” sign and was significant, the other 
two correlations were insignificant. 
These results of Diener et al. are striking when we compare them with the results 
of Stutzer, McBride and Ferrer-i-Carbonell as discussed above. However, the following 
points on Diener et al.’s results can be made. First, in the individual cross-section study 
of Diener et al. (1993), SWB was measured as a hedonic-level-of-affect balance (the pre-
ponderance of pleasant over unpleasant affect). Although such hedonic measures of SWB 
tend to be strongly positively correlated with life satisfaction measures, hedonic affect 
seems to be less sensitive to adaptation and social comparison than the more cognitive 
evaluation measure of life satisfaction (see Frey and Stutzer 2002, Sec. 1.2, for a discus-
sion; see also Peiró, 2003). 
Secondly, Diener et al. (1993) themselves raise the point that the ten-years period 
over which the income change was measured in their cross-section study might be too 
long since complete adaptation is likely to occur within a shorter time period. Still, they 
had expected some correlation with SWB from recent changes in the income of some in-
dividuals in the cross-section. On the other hand, in the national cross-section study of 
Diener et al. (1995), correlations of SWB with growth of per capita GDP, which repre-
sents income changes over one year, were insignificant or inconsistent as well. Stutzer’s 
result that approximating people’s previous income Y-1 with their current income yields a 
significant estimated coefficient ϕ-1 in eq. (3) for the aspiration level Y* suggests that the 
insignificant results of Diener et al. (1993, 1995) may be due to an adaptation of Y* to Y 
within much less than a year. In that case a large part of the effects of adaptation in the 
analyses of Diener et al. would be included as a negative effect of Y on SWB within the 
net positive effect of Y. The insignificant or inconsistent correlations of Diener et al. may 
also be due to an “overshooting” of aspiration levels over fast rising income levels in 
countries with rapid economic growth (as mentioned by Diener et al. 1995: 852). This 
may be modelled by assuming that the coefficient ϕ-1 in eq. (3) for the aspiration level is 
an increasing function of relative income growth ∆lnY. The important thing to note here 
is that the insignificant adaptation results of Diener et al. are not necessarily inconsistent 
with the aspiration-level approach. 
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Diener et al. (1993, 1995)’s insignificant or negative results for social comparison 
can have different possible reasons, as extensively discussed by Diener et al. (1993: 217-
221). Going into that is beyond the scope of this paper, but we would like to suggest here 
one other possible reason. Living as a rich person in a poor country might not only have 
the benefits of a higher relative income (in terms of SWB), but also have costs due to 
worse general living conditions such as less security and worse public facilities. Con-
versely, living as a poor person in a rich area may not only have the costs of a lower rela-
tive income, but also benefits due to better general living conditions. These benefits and 
costs may more or less counterbalance each other, leading to no significant net effect of 
the economic prosperity in one’s living area on SWB.12 Such possible differences in liv-
ing conditions are not likely to affect aspiration levels such as modelled in Stutzer’s eq. 
(3) nor to play a role in the impact of average cohort or social-group incomes in the mod-
els of McBride and Ferrer-i-Carbonell.  
Another paper which is critical about the aspiration-level approach and the im-
plied happiness-is-relative view is Veenhoven (1991). In a general analysis he argues that 
extreme claims on the basis of that view are unwarranted. Again, it is beyond the scope of 
this paper to discuss all his arguments, but one criticism is particularly important and in-
teresting in the present context. He finds that the higher the GDP of a country, the lower 
the correlation between individual happiness and income. This is inconsistent with the 
assumption that relative-income effects are just as strong (or weak) at low income levels 
as they are at high income levels. Indeed, McBride (2001) finds that RIS variables appear 
to have much stronger effects on life satisfaction for those in higher-income groups than 
for those in lower-income groups, while the effect of an increase in income is much 
smaller. This can explain Veenhoven’s finding, but it raises the question where these dif-
ferences in reactions to relative (and absolute) income come from. Yet, an important 
point to note is that this explanation does not require abandoning the relative-income ap-
proach. More in general, the negative results of Veenhoven (1991) and Diener et al. 
(1993, 1995) with respect to this approach seem to apply to particular specifications of 
the relative-income hypothesis, and hence are not able to reject more general and flexible 
                                                 
12 Results of Schyns (2002) even suggest dominant living-conditions effects of national wealth on SWB. 
 18 
versions of the relative-income hypothesis, which allow some impact of absolute income 
on LS as well. 
Our conclusion from this short survey is that a lot more empirical research is 
needed to test the aspiration-level approach, but that first econometric results, in particu-
lar of Stutzer (2002), look promising. Together with empirical analyses like those of 
Easterlin (2001), they suggest that the aspiration-level (and positional-externalities) ap-
proach can explain a large part of the stylised facts with respect to the correlations of in-
come and life satisfaction. However, the suggestion from Stutzer’s estimates that this ex-
planation may only be partial leaves room for other possible explanations. Moreover, 
there are indications (Headey et al. 1991) that causality is not so much running from aspi-
ration levels towards happiness, but rather from happiness towards aspiration levels (see 
also Richins and Dawson 1992: 313). This possibility is analysed in the context of an al-
ternative explanation of a discrepancy between decision utility and experienced utility of 
income in the next section. 
 
4. Intrinsic versus extrinsic goals 
a. Motivational SWB theory 
Veenhoven (1991) emphasises that even in affluent societies overall life satisfaction does 
not entirely depend on cognitive comparison, but also on how one feels affectively. In his 
view, overall life satisfaction does not only have a cognitive component which indicates 
the ‘degree to which an individual perceives her aspirations to be met’ (contentment). It 
also has an affective component representing the ‘degree to which the various affects a 
person experiences are pleasant’ (hedonic level), prior to any cognitive evaluation. This 
hedonic level of affect draws on the gratification of basic bio-psychological needs. To the 
extent that life satisfaction depends on this need gratification, it hinges, in Veenhoven’s 
view, on absolute levels of income rather than relative levels. This view finds support in 
the empirical results of Diener et al. (1993, 1995) as discussed at the end of the previous 
section. 
Diener et al. (1993: 220-221) also discuss some reasons why income may make a 
difference in (hedonic) happiness even beyond the level of meeting one’s elementary bio-
logical needs. Two reasons they mention are remarkable and important in the present 
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context. First, status may accrue to people with relatively greater wealth, even at high 
levels of income. Secondly, society may generate needs in people which can be better 
met with an increasing income. For example, the structure of richer societies may make it 
difficult to do one’s grocery shopping by bus (cf. p. 8). Interestingly, both reasons imply 
that the hedonic level of affect emphasised by Veenhoven depends on relative income, 
the former via a frame-of-reference effect, the latter via secondary inflation (see the ex-
planations on p. 8). This suggests that a need approach to happiness has some overlap 
with the relative-income-standard approach. It also suggests that we should make a dis-
tinction between a category of needs the satisfaction of which primarily depends on abso-
lute income, and a category of needs the satisfaction of which primarily depends on rela-
tive income. 
An approach which implies such a distinction and which moreover implies a sec-
ond source of difference between decision utility and experienced utility of income can 
be based on research results of Kasser and Ryan (1993, 1996; see also Kasser and Ahuvia 
2002) about intrinsic and extrinsic goals. Their data show first of all that a distinction be-
tween intrinsic goals—self-acceptance, affiliation, community feeling, and physical fit-
ness—and extrinsic goals—financial success, social recognition, and appealing appear-
ance—actually does reflect a consistent pattern in people’s preferences: the mutual corre-
lation of the importance scores given to each goal is substantial within each group of 
goals, but negligible across the two groups. That is, someone who declares financial suc-
cess to be a relatively important goal will in general place more importance on other ex-
trinsic goals than on intrinsic goals. 
As a second result, it turned out that subjects giving relative centrality to extrinsic 
goals tended to score lower on subjective well-being measures than subjects for whom 
intrinsic goals were more central13, and this result appeared not to be influenced by the 
actual income of respondents. For brevity, we will call this the motivational SWB theory. 
On the whole it seems safe to conclude (1) that it makes sense to distinguish between in-
                                                 
13 Sagiv and Schwartz (2000) argue that this effect depends on whether the environment encourages or dis-
courages such values, but Kasser and Ahuvia (2002) produce evidence to the contrary (examining a sample 
of Singaporean business students) and claim that Sagiv and Schwartz’s study refers to different concepts 
(“power” instead of “extrinsic values”) and suffers from small sample sizes (n=42). 
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trinsic and extrinsic goals and (2) that giving priority to extrinsic goals over intrinsic ones 
is generally associated with reduced well-being. 
To relate the motivational SWB theory back to the distinction between decision 
and experienced utility, these findings can be interpreted as follows. It seems reasonable 
to assume that the relative importance an individual attaches to a particular goal will de-
termine with how large a weight this dimension will impact on decision utility. Experi-
enced utility, however, appears to be more or less independent from the goal priorities an 
individual holds. In other words, the fact that a person finds financial success particularly 
important does not mean that he will actually derive more satisfaction from achieving 
financial success than anybody else. As a consequence, a person who overemphasises 
extrinsic goals will be characterised by a discrepancy between decision and experienced 
utility: his decisions will not effectively maximise experienced utility. Decision and ex-
perienced utility will only coincide when there is some optimal assignment of relative 
weights to extrinsic and intrinsic goals in decision utility. 
There is a conspicuous parallel between the extrinsic/intrinsic distinction and the 
respective roles of relative and absolute income. As it seems, the satisfaction of extrinsic 
desires—in particular social recognition and financial success—is to a large extent rela-
tive, while the satisfaction of intrinsic desires—especially affiliation and community feel-
ing—is much less dependent on social comparison. Strong evidence supporting this view 
comes from studies of pay satisfaction, which regularly find a strong correlation between 
(experienced) satisfaction with income and relative-income variables (Kapteyn and 
Wansbeek 1985, Clark and Oswald 1996). Hence, for a person who gives high priority to 
extrinsic goals, decision utility may be expected to be strongly influenced by relative-
income considerations and adapting aspiration levels. On the other hand, the experienced 
utility of such a person depends more strongly on the satisfaction of intrinsic needs, 
which is much less sensitive to relative income. Although the results of Diener et al. 
(1993) suggest that, even in higher income brackets, experienced utility is still somewhat 
sensitive to absolute income, overall it will depend less on income than the decision util-
ity of people focusing on extrinsic goals. If in developed countries the overemphasis on 
extrinsic goals is pervasive (as argued by Lane 2000, e.g.), we can expect a substantial 
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effect from the discrepancy between decision and experienced utility of these people that 
will be felt on all levels of aggregation. 
A recent study by Nickerson et al. (2003) further investigated the relation be-
tween the extrinsic goal of financial success and happiness, and produced interesting re-
sults. As a main result they found that actual income moderates and even neutralizes the 
negative effect of an extrinsic focus on happiness. In contrast to the Kasser and Ryan 
(1996) results, the richer the group you look at, the less will be the “happiness bonus” of 
less financially focused people. Eventually, as you move up the income ladder, the hap-
piness difference between the most and the least financially motivated groups fades to 
less than 0.1 on a 5-point scale (for 1995 incomes above US$100,000).14 Hence, if the 
results can be interpreted temporally (and not only cross-sectionally)15, it is true that a 
financially focused individual will derive more happiness from becoming rich than a per-
son placing less value on financial success. On the other hand, however, the fact that fi-
nancial success is a person’s top priority does not mean that, once he has achieved 
wealth, he will be happier than someone who achieved financial success without really 
caring that much about it. The crucial point is that the latter person will start out with 
higher happiness to begin with, allowing her to end up on the same happiness level. It 
should be noted that a comparison is made between one group of people who actually 
attained the extrinsic goal they aspired (financial success) and a group of people who 
cherish more intrinsic priorities they may or may not have achieved (even though they 
also happen to be rich). In other words, this comparison does not tell us how the happi-
ness derived from achieving an extrinsic goal relates to that derived from achieving an 
intrinsic goal. The fact that financial success does not make extrinsically focused people 
happier than intrinsically focused individuals, however, suggests that the attainment of 
intrinsic goals may actually bring a higher happiness payoff. 
                                                 
14 Unfortunately the authors do not report significance levels, but it seems safe to assume that the positive 
difference of  +.03 for the highest income group (above US$200,000) is not significant. It certainly is not 
substantial when compared to -.84 for the lowest income group (up to US$1000). 
15 Even though the authors claim—with some justification—to be doing a longitudinal study, the results 
presented here are to be interpreted cross-sectionally since no change of wealth and happiness over time is 
analyzed (even though the parents’ household income in 1975 is controlled for in some settings). 
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b. Top-down interpretation 
The motivational SWB theory can now be related to the aspiration-level theory discussed 
in the previous section as follows. There is some evidence (Diener 1984, Headey et al. 
1991, Schyns 2001) that causality may not only be running from domain satisfac-
tions/aspiration levels towards life satisfaction (“bottom-up”, as assumed in the aspira-
tion-level theory), but also from life satisfaction towards domain satisfactions/aspiration 
levels (“top-down”). In particular, for Australian data (1981-1987) Headey et al. found 
top-down causation for satisfaction with material living standard, which comes close to 
financial situation. This raises the question how then life satisfaction is determined. One 
possible explanation starts from the observation that, according to the motivational SWB 
theory, the degree of life satisfaction depends strongly on the satisfaction of intrinsic 
needs and this tends to be lower for persons who give higher priority to extrinsic goals. 
The latter persons will then declare to be less satisfied with more or less all domains (due 
to top-down causation), including financial situation. However, the hedonic and the cog-
nitive levels of satisfaction of such a person may be inconsistent: While out of his general 
mood he will claim to be unhappy with his financial situation (hedonic level), his cogni-
tive evaluation of matters will give him little reason to complain about his finances (cog-
nitive level). To reduce this cognitive dissonance, he may revise his aspiration level up-
wards, much as if he thought, “my financial situation doesn’t seem to be that bad at first 
sight, but I would certainly be a happier person if I had more money”. In the context of 
eq. (3) for the aspiration level Y* (p. 11), this could be modelled by assuming that the ϕ 
coefficients are higher the more unhappy the person is. At the same time, his focus on 
financial success (and, more generally, extrinsic goals) will be reinforced, which further 
suppresses his hedonic level of life satisfaction. Thus, we would have a loop of reinforc-
ing negative feedbacks between focus on extrinsic goals and hedonic level of life satis-
faction, with the cognitive levels of life and domain satisfactions and aspiration levels 
only being derivatives. Exogenous determinants of this feedback loop would primarily be 
culture on a collective level and personality traits on an individual level.  
What is still missing in this tentative theory is an explanation of the bias towards 
financial success or extrinsic goals in general. It is not obvious why cognitive dissonance 
between (higher) hedonic level of affect and (lower) cognitive satisfaction should be re-
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duced by revising extrinsic aspiration levels only, and not also by revising aspirations of 
intrinsic goals as well. The mechanism described above, one might think, could as well 
lead an unhappy nature to place priority on the pursuit of intrinsic goals such as friend-
ship and community feeling. The reason why an unhappy character is more likely to fo-
cus on extrinsic than intrinsic values might be the perceived control over the respective 
domain satisfactions. One may (perhaps correctly) believe to have more control over 
one’s earning power than over the number and quality of friendships. People indeed ap-
pear to spend much more time and effort on education aimed at improving one’s value on 
the labour market than on enhancing the ability to make friends. While this explanation 
seems to be a plausible one, we concede that further research is needed to substantiate 
this argument. 
 
c. Failures to learn and wanting versus liking 
Apart from the question through which mechanism exactly the bias towards extrinsic 
goals operates, it should be noted that the mere existence of a systematic bias against (ex-
perienced) utility maximisation, which is also posited by the aspiration-level theory, 
would clearly be an embarrassment to the rational-behaviour hypothesis that is central to 
much of economic theory. While this hypothesis does not claim that people will always 
succeed in maximising utility in an absolute sense, it does claim that people learn from 
past mistakes and will not commit a particular type of error systematically. Rationality in 
this sense would require that a financially well-endowed individual who has for some 
while sought happiness in ever more material affluence, realises that aspiring more 
wealth does not pay off as expected. As a consequence she would revise her value priori-
ties in favour of intrinsic goals and discover that this is the more efficient strategy. 
So, do people really fail to learn? Are they irrational after all? Psychologists who 
examined human decision processes closer indeed tend to subscribe to such a view.16 
Loewenstein and Schkade (1999), e.g., conclude that 
“Learning from experience does not seem to offer a broad cure for prediction errors because 
intuitive theories are often resistant to change, memories of experience are often themselves 
                                                 
16 In fact not only psychologists do. Easterlin (2001) is an economist who also breaks with the identity of 
decision and experienced utility in the context of his aspiration-level theory. 
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biased or incomplete, and experiences rarely repeat themselves often enough to make diagnos-
tic patterns noticeable.” (p. 85) 
They even doubt that expected hedonic payoff is a conscious deliberation in everyday 
decision making in the first place: 
“In fact, as Langer (1989) and others have pointed out, many decisions involve little conscious 
deliberation. People decide based on rules ..., habits ..., and gut feelings, none of which in-
volve explicit predictions of future feelings. The most common source of experimental sur-
prise could therefore be the absence of an explicit prediction in the first place.”17 (p. 100) 
This interpretation is also strengthened by neurophysiological evidence. As Ber-
ridge (1999) reports, wanting and liking (corresponding to decision and experienced util-
ity, respectively) emerge from two separate neural substrates (p. 541). In experiments in-
volving the manipulation of particular brain regions of rats, it is possible to demonstrate 
states of “wanting without liking” (eating unswallowable food) and “liking without want-
ing” (refusing tasty food). Such states have also been observed in human drug addicts. 
Even though it is difficult to demonstrate the existence of this dissociation between want-
ing and liking in healthy individuals, the physiological separation of wanting and liking 
suggests that they will not, as assumed in most of economic decision theory, naturally 
coincide, but that some—possibly complex and perhaps fallible—intermediary process is 
at work in human decision making. Observed choice might therefore not accurately re-
flect where people derive satisfaction from. 
The evidence reviewed in this section has been merged to a theory in which there 
is a mutual interaction between focus on extrinsic goals and hedonic level of life satisfac-
tion. On the one hand, people who overemphasise extrinsic goals will end up less happy 
than those who place higher priority on intrinsic goals because their decisions will be 
based on systematically biased predictions of experienced utility. The failure to draw the 
appropriate lessons from the consistent failure to realise the hoped-for happiness payoff 
will perpetuate such a pattern. On the other hand, it can be argued that a predisposition to 
                                                 
17 The rational behavior hypothesis can of coursed be saved—once more—by claiming that, at the end of 
the day, following imperfect rules and “gut feelings” is more efficient than spending much effort looking 
for the perfect decision. Whether this argument is valid in this context will depend on how bad these rules 
and habits really are. 
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be unhappy will make a person prioritise extrinsic goals, probably because people believe 
to have more control over the satisfaction of extrinsic than of intrinsic desires and be-
cause they do not realise that the adaptation of aspiration levels renders the pursuit of ex-
trinsic goals partly self-defeating.  
By means of the motivational SWB theory we are able to account for the finding 
that the observed behaviour and the stated preference for income overstate the contribu-
tion of income to actual life satisfaction. People who overemphasise extrinsic over intrin-
sic goals will neglect those needs whose fulfilment would durably enhance well-being 
while excessively focusing on those needs whose pursuit will not bring lasting increases 
of happiness. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Let us take stock of the relative merits of the two approaches discussed in Sections 3 and 
4. Both the aspiration-level and the extrinsic/intrinsic-needs approach point to sources of 
discrepancies between decision utility and experienced utility of income. In addition, the 
theory of positional externalities supplements these explanations in terms of individual 
irrationality with the implications of collective irrationality. Both the aspiration-level the-
ory and the theory of positional externalities yield much more specific explanations of 
zero or low correlations between income and life satisfaction at different levels of analy-
sis (see Table 2) than the intrinsic/extrinsic-goals approach so far.  
On the other hand, the aspiration-level approach presupposes that the relations be-
tween aspiration levels/domain satisfactions and life satisfaction are purely bottom-up, 
while there is considerable evidence to the contrary.18 When aspiration levels and domain 
satisfactions are endogenously determined by life satisfaction (top-down), the intrin-
sic/extrinsic-goals approach explains why focusing on financial success in decision utility 
yields little gain in experienced utility. 
There is now some evidence (e.g. Schyns 2001) that top-down and bottom-up re-
lations may work at the same time, resulting in feedback loops. The bottom-up relations 
                                                 
18 This evidence as well as the contribution of intrinsic domain satisfactions to life satisfaction are ne-
glected in economic approaches like that of Van Praag et al. (2002).  
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may then imply that the low sensitivity of life satisfaction to fulfilment of extrinsic goals 
may be partly due to the dynamics of aspiration levels and positional externalities. What, 
at the very least, becomes clear from these results, is that a black-and-white dichotomy 
between, on the one hand, aspiration-level approaches in terms of relative happiness and, 
on the other hand, needs approaches in terms of absolute happiness does not appear to be 
appropriate. 
 
Acknowledgements 
We thank Bart Golsteyn, Amado Peiró, Alois Stutzer, Ruut Veenhoven, Geert Woltjer 
and other participants to the conference “The Paradoxes of Happiness in Economics” in 
Milan, 21-23 March 2003, for helpful comments and Peggy Schyns for sending us some 
of her papers.  
 
References 
Argyle, M. (1999). “Causes and Correlates of Happiness”. In D. Kahneman, E. Diener and N. 
Schwarz (eds.), Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology. New York: Russel Sage 
Foundation, 353-373. 
Berridge, K.C. (1999). “Pleasure, Pain, Desire, and Dread: Hidden Core Processes of Emotion”. 
In D. Kahneman, E. Diener and N. Schwarz (eds.), Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic 
Psychology. New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 525-557. 
Cantril, H. (1965). The Pattern of Human Concerns. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press. 
Clark, A.E. and A.J. Oswald (1996). “Satisfaction and Comparison Income.” Journal of Public 
Economics, 61, 359-381. 
Diener, E. (1984). Subjective Well-Being. Psychological Bulletin, 95(3), 542-575. 
Diener, E., M. Diener, and C. Diener (1995). “Factors Predicting the Subjective Well-Being of 
Nations.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 851-864. 
Diener, E., E. Sandvik, L. Seidlitz, and M. Diener (1993). “The Relationship between Income and 
Subjective Well-Being: Relative or Absolute?” Social Indicators Research, 28, 195-223. 
Diener, E., and E.M. Suh (1999). “National Differences in Subjective Well-Being.” In D. Kah-
neman, E. Diener & N. Schwarz (eds.), Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology. 
New York: Russel Sage Foundation: 434-450. 
 27 
Easterlin, R.A. (1974). “Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evi-
dence.” In P. A. David and M. W. Reder (eds.), Nations and Households in Economic 
Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramowitz. New York and London: Academic Press: 89-
125. 
Easterlin, R.A. (2001). “Income and Happiness: Towards a Unified Theory.” The Economic 
Journal, 111(473), 465-484. 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A. (2002). “Income and Well-Being: An Empirical Analysis of the Compari-
son Income Effect.” Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 2002-019/3, www.tinbergen.nl.  
Festinger, L. (1954). “A Theory of Social Comparison.” Human Relations, 7, 117-140. 
Frank, R.H. (1999). Luxury Fever: Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Era of Excess. New York: 
Free Press. 
Frank, R.H. (1997). “The frame of reference as a public good.” The Economic Journal, 107(Nov), 
1832-47. 
Frederick, S., and G. Loewenstein (1999). “Hedonic Adaptation”. In D. Kahneman, E. Diener and 
N. Schwarz (eds.), Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology. New York: Russel 
Sage Foundation, 302-329. 
Frey, B.S., and A. Stutzer (2002). Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and Institutions 
Affect Well-Being. Oxford: Princeton Univerity Press. 
Gardner, J., & Oswald, A. J. (2001). Does Money Buy Happiness? A Longitudinal Study Using 
Data on Windfalls.Unpublished manuscript, Warwick University. 
Glatzer, W. (1991). “Quality of life in advanced industrialized countries: The case of West Ger-
many.” In F. Strack, M. Argyle and N. Schwarz (eds.), Subjective Well-Being: An Interdisci-
plinary Perspective. Oxford: Pergamon: 261-279. 
Headey, B., R. Veenhoven, and A. Wearing (1991). “Top-down versus bottom-up theories of sub-
jective well-being.” Social Indicators Research, 24, 81-100. 
Hirata, J. (2001). Happiness and Economics: Enriching Economic Theory with Empirical Psy-
chology. Master thesis, Maastricht University, http://johanneshirata. gmxhome.de. 
Hirsch, F. (1976). The Social Limits to Growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and Organizations. Boston: McGraw-Hill. 
Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press. 
Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky (1984). “Choices, values and frames.” American Psychologist, 39, 
341-50. 
 28 
Kapteyn, A., and T. Wansbeek: 1985, “The individual welfare function: A review.” Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 6, 333-363. 
Kasser, T., and A. Ahuvia (2002). “Materialistic values and well-being in business students.” 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 32(1), 137-146. 
Kasser, T. and R.M. Ryan (1993). “A dark side of the American dream: Correlates and financial 
success as a central life aspiration.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 410-22.  
Kasser, T., and R.M. Ryan (1996). “Further examining the American dream: Differential corre-
lates of intrinsic and extrinsic goals.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 280-87. 
Kenny, C. (1999). “Does growth cause happiness, or does happiness cause growth?” Kyklos, 
52(1), 3-26. 
Killingsworth, M. and J. Heckman (1986). “Female Labour Supply: A Survey.” In O. Ashenfelter 
and P.R.G. Layard (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 1, Amsterdam: New Holland. 
Lane, R. E. (2000). The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Langer, E. (1989). Mindfulness. Reading: Addison-Wesley. 
Loewenstein, G., and D. Schkade (1999). “Wouldn't it Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings.” In 
D. Kahneman, E. Diener and N. Schwarz (eds.), Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic 
Psychology. New York: Russel Sage Foundation: 85-105. 
McBride, M. (2001). “Relative-income effects on subjective well-being in the cross-section.” 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 45, 251-278. 
Nickerson, C., N. Schwarz, E. Diener, and D. Kahneman (2003). “Zeroing in on the Dark Side of 
the American Dream: A Closer Look at the Negative Consequences of the Goal for Financial 
Success.” Psychological Science (forthcoming, Nov. 2003).  
Olson, J.M., C.P. Herman and M.P. Zanna (eds.) (1986). Relative Deprivation and Social Com-
parison: The Ontario Symposium, Vol. 4. Hillsdal, NJ, and London: Lawrence Erlbaum Asso-
ciates. 
Peiró, A. (2003). “Happiness, Satisfaction and Socioeconomic Conditions: Some International 
Evidence.” Paper presented at Conference ‘The Paradoxes of Happiness in Economics”, Mi-
lan, 21-23 March.  
Pencavel, J. (1986). “Labour Supply of Men: A Survey.” In O. Ashenfelter and P.R.G. Layard 
(eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 1, Amsterdam: New Holland. 
Richins, M. L., and S. Dawson (1992). “A Consumer Values Orientation for Materialism and its 
Measurement: Scale Development and Validation.” Journal of Consumer Research, 19(3), 
303-316. 
 29 
Sagiv, L., and S.H. Schwartz (2000). “Value Priorities and Subjective Well-being: Direct Rela-
tions and Congruity Effects.” European Journal of Social Psychology, 30(2), 177-198. 
Schyns, P (2001). “Income and satisfaction in Russia.” Journal of Happiness Studies, 2, 173-204. 
Schyns, P. (2002). “Wealth Of Nations, Individual Income and Life Satisfaction in 42 Countries: 
A Multilevel Approach.” Social Indicators Research, 60, 5-40. 
Sen, A. K. (1985). Commodities and Capabilities. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Slovic, P. (2000/1991). “The Construction of Preference.” In D. Kahneman and A. Tversky 
(eds.), Choices, Values, and Frames. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 489-502. 
Stouffer, S.A., E.A. Suchman, L.C. DeVinney, S.A. Star, and R.M. Williams (1949). The Ameri-
can Soldier: Adjustment during Army life (Vol. 1). Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Stutzer, A. (2002). “The role of income aspirations in individual happiness”, Working Paper 124, 
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, forthcoming in Journal 
of Economic Behavior and Organization.  
Van Praag, B.M.S. (1993). “The Relativity of the Welfare Concept”. In M. C. Nussbaum and A. 
K. Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 362-385. 
Van Praag, B.M.S. and P. Frijters (1999). “The Measurement of Welfare and Well-Being: The 
Leyden Approach”. In D. Kahneman, E. Diener and N. Schwarz (eds.), Well-Being: The 
Foundations of Hedonic Psychology. New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 413-433. 
Van Praag, B. M. S., P. Frijters, and A. Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2002). “The Anatomy of Subjective 
Well-Being.” Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 2002-022/3, www.tinbergen.nl. 
Van Praag, B.M.S., A. Kapteyn, and F.G. Herwaarden (1979). “The definition and measurement 
of social reference spaces.” Netherlands Journal of Sociology, 15, 13-25. 
Veenhoven, R. (1991). “Is happiness relative?” Social Indicators Research, 24, 1-34.   
Veenhoven, R. (1996). “Developments in satisfaction research.” Social Indicators Research, 37, 
1, 1-46. 
Vendrik, M.C.M. (1993). Collective Habits and Social Norms in Labour Supply: From Micromo-
tives to Macrobehavior. Doctoral thesis, Maastricht University. 
Wong, N., and A. Ahuvia (1998). “Personal Taste and Family Face: Luxury Consumption in 
Confucian and Western Societies.” Psychology and Marketing, 15(5), 423-441. 
 30 
